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FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSIES AND
CONSEQUENCES ON CAMPUS
Stuart Chinn
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY AND HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
(YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS 2017). PP . 216. HARDCOVER $26.00.
J OHN PALFREY, S AFE SPACES, BRAVE SPACES: DIVERSITY AND FREE
EXPRESSION IN EDUCATION (MIT PRESS 2017). PP . 192. HARDCOVER
$19.95. PAPERBACK $16.95.
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND
FREE SPEECH (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP . 232.
HARDCOVER $24.95.

Given the current political and social climate, it is no surprise that the topic of
campus free speech has garnered significant recent attention from both academics and
public commentators. Aside from the most obvious cause of this attention—a number of
high profile and ideologically contentious events on or near university campuses, some
with violent consequences1— other related considerations are also likely at play.
Perhaps most fundamentally, many university campuses strive to create a rather
unique type of community in American society, where strangers are thrust together for
often extensive interaction in class, in dorms, and elsewhere on campus. Combine this with
a relatively entrenched and widespread commitment to cultivating diversity within higher
education student bodies, and one might reasonably view college campuses as one of the
few sites in American society where a realistic aspiration exists for genuine communitybuilding across lines of race, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, class, and
other dimensions of social status. At their best, university campuses may serve as an ideal
for American society.

1. The authors of all three books reviewed here helpfully reference a number of recent free speech
controversies on university and college campuses. See E RWIN C HEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN , FREE
SPEECH ON C AMPUS 1–8 (2017); JOHN PALFREY, SAFE SPACES, B RAVE SPACES: D IVERSITY AND FREE
E XPRESSION IN E DUCATION 6–8, 23–28 (2017); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON , SPEAK FREELY : WHY
UNIVERSITIES M UST DEFEND FREE SPEECH 148–50 (2018). Full disclosure: one of the events referenced by
Chemerinsky and Gillman occurred at my law school, and I signed a public letter written in response to the event.
The event and/or the public letter are mentioned in CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, at 8, 78, 121–22.
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Yet, alongside such aspirations exists another commonality between the two: if
American society has long struggled with the question of how to preserve stability and
facilitate the creation of commonality in the face of deep plurality, university campuses
have struggled with a version of the same problem. Granted, the scope of plurality may be
narrower on many university campuses. Yet, the intensity of conflict may also be
particularly heightened there given the close and sustained interaction between university
community members. Campus free speech controversies are hardly unique to our time. 2
Still, it is not surprising that a number of high-profile controversies have arisen in recent
years. As ideological polarization has grown within American society, it would seem
inevitable that those controversies would find their way to university campuses as
microcosms of American society itself.
I. GRAPPLING WITH CAMPUS SPEECH PROBLEMS
Entering this space are three extraordinarily timely books that aim to make sense of
the preceding questions: Erwin Chemerinsky & Howard Gillman’s Free Speech on
Campus; John Palfrey’s Safe Spaces, Brave Spaces: Diversity and Free Expression in
Education; and Keith Whittington’s Speak Freely: Why Universities Must Defend Free
Speech. I should note at the outset that there is a significant amount of convergence among
all three books, which speaks to some of the common virtues they share. First, each book
frames the current controversies over campus free speech in a roughly similar way: if one
starts with the presumption that free speech on campus is central, and that equality and
inclusion are likewise central values, then a question arises as to how universities should
proceed when those values are in conflict. In these situations of conflict and tension, the
question that arises is one of prioritization. And for all who recognize the importance of
free speech, arguably the greatest challenge to asserting its primacy against competing
values like equality comes in the form of campus speech that would denigrate, insult, and
dehumanize other members of the campus community. In the face of this type of speech,
should free speech principles still prevail? Or, might some limits to free speech be
defended on the grounds of equality or some other set of values?
Beyond this, all three books recognize that satisfying answers to these questions
have to go beyond the narrower question of legal permissibility. Having clarity about likely
legal limitations for universities, within the current legal landscape, is no doubt critical for
all who care about these issues. However, given that judges and legal rules can always
change, the more central questions revolve around the normative-theoretical justifications
that can be brought to bear in support of potential solutions and plausible legal rules
dealing with these issues. Again, to their credit all three works acknowledge this, as
evidenced by the fact that each goes beyond mere legal doctrine in its respective
arguments.3 Finally, as already implied, the three books overlap in that they largely share
2. Most recently, scholarly and public discussion about campus hate speech occurred in the 1980s and 1990s.
For some key works from that time, see Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
795 (1993).
3. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at xi; PALFREY, supra note 1, at 18; WHITTINGTON, supra note
1, at 6.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss2/4

2

Chinn: Free Speech Controversies and Consequences on Campus
CHINN, S-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSIES

2/15/2019 3:13 PM

227

a rather pragmatic spirit: for Chemerinsky & Gillman and Palfrey, especially, there is a
clear focus on problem-solving and finding the “best” approaches to shoring up free speech
and equality values, while taking into account various institutional considerations and
consequences.
Yet if this last point marks a point of convergence, it also signals a point of partial
divergence as well. Even if each book is oriented in part to practical problem-solving, there
is unsurprisingly no consensus among them as to the best approach in dealing with these
issues. This point of relative divergence will thus be the focus of this essay. After briefly
commenting on each book, I will critically evaluate their respective approaches to
managing the tensions between free speech and other important values on a university
campus. Ultimately, I do have greater sympathy for Palfrey’s position, which would press
toward a view of giving universities and decision-makers greater flexibility in regulating
speech that is both antithetical to the goals of equality, and offers insignificant
contributions to the discovery of knowledge or robust interpersonal exchange. This is a
view that is admittedly not supported in the constitutional legal doctrine, though it has
healthy and sustained support in a significant portion of the secondary literature. I will aim
to press these latter points by sketching out a few thoughts in the final Part of this essay. 4
As a law school dean and a university president, respectively, it is no surprise that
Chemerinsky and Gillman have written a book on campus speech problems with an eye to
problem-solving. Both clearly have a strong, real-world sense of the types of problems that
confront university leaders in the present time. Befitting this experience, both are clear in
endorsing the values of equality and inclusion, which enjoy near-unanimous support in the
world of higher education. 5 Yet with respect to the tensions that may arise between these
values and free speech, the authors are emphatic in emphasizing what amounts to a default
presumption in favor of free speech. As they state,
Our central thesis is that all ideas and views should be able to be expressed on college
campuses, no matter how offensive or how uncomfortable they make people feel. But there
are steps that campuses can and should take to create inclusive communities where all
students feel protected . . . . Our position is absolute: campuses never can censor or punish
the expression of ideas, however offensive, because otherwise they cannot perform their
function of promoting inquiry, discovery, and the dissemination of new knowledge. 6

This strong defense of free speech stems from two key considerations. The first is
the necessity of free speech to support the core function of universities to discover and
disseminate knowledge, as referenced in the preceding quotation.7 The second speaks to a
concern about administrative competence: Chemerinsky and Gillman concede that certain
types of speech may have more questionable value in the discovery of knowledge, and that
in some circumstances, the potential benefit of certain types of speech may be far
outweighed by its potential costs. As a result, they take no issue with legal restrictions on
racially or sexually harassing speech or true threats. 8 But beyond these narrow categories

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra p. 231.
CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at x, xi.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 20, 49–81.
Id. at 63, 115–16, 121. However, recall the earlier quotation, which references their “absolute” position
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of problematic speech, they express concerns about university administrators having the
competence to make defensible distinctions between permissible and impermissible
speech on campuses. The worry here is the familiar one of the slippery slope, where a
university code against “hate speech” might then morph into a burdensome and
intellectually stifling demand for conformity in behavior and thought. 9
Still, as noted above, Chemerinsky and Gillman do not offer an absolutist defense
of free speech. They do recognize some limitations on this right including the
aforementioned legal restrictions on several categories of speech such as racially and
sexually harassing speech. In addition, they recognize that negative consequences for the
academic mission might demand the restriction of some forms of speech in the classroom
by students, faculty members (bound by professional norms and obligations), and others. 10
Indeed, this ties to one point of emphasis in the book: Chemerinsky and Gillman’s
recognition of separate zones within a university where the demands of free speech rights
might vary. In the professional zone of the classroom and research, Chemerinsky and
Gillman recognize that greater curtailment of free speech rights may be necessary, while
in the broader zone of the campus community, stronger free speech rights are warranted.11
Chemerinsky and Gillman thus concede a point that I will subsequently return to: a
recognition that academic expertise may provide a compelling justification for limiting the
free speech rights of faculty, students, and outside speakers in certain circumstances.
Finally, Chemerinsky and Gillman offer one additional point in support of equality
values: they insist, rightly to my mind, that universities need not be neutral when it comes
to intolerant and hateful speech. They would defend the free speech rights of racists and
bigots on campus, but they would also defend the right of university administrators to take
clear and unequivocal stands on these issues. 12 A free speech absolutist might view such
actions by university administrators as heavy-handed and potentially chilling of the speech
of those on campus who disagree, but Chemerinsky and Gillman see these potential actions
by administrators as a valuable and defensible means of supporting other campus
community members who might be placed in an especially vulnerable position because of
hateful and intolerant speech.
John Palfrey’s Safe Spaces, Brave Spaces is likewise a smart intervention on these
issues, and similar to Chemerinsky and Gillman, he arrives to these debates armed with
the benefit of insights gleaned from being a former law faculty member and the head of a
prep school. Like Chemerinsky and Gillman, Palfrey brings a welcome sense of
concreteness and practicality to the problems of campus speech. He frames his primary
concern quite succinctly: in the context of an educational setting like a university or

in defense of the “expression of ideas.” When juxtaposing these statements to their endorsement of legal
restrictions on harassing speech or true threats, one might wonder how they would define an “idea” or a “view”
as both (a) distinct from harassing or threatening speech but still (b) incapable of being distinguished from racial
epithets, hanging nooses, or cross-burnings—at least some instances of which they would characterize as ideas
or views worthy of being protected.
9. Id. at 103–08.
10. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 66–69.
11. Id. at 77.
12. Id. at 20, 145–50.
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college, “[a]t what point may, or must, the tolerant stop tolerating the intolerant?” 13 He
hits many of the same points as Chemerinsky and Gillman (and Whittington as well) in
jointly endorsing the importance of free expression and diversity; 14 expressing an anxiety
about speech regulations snowballing into illegitimate censorship; 15 endorsing the value
of a broad exchange of ideas in educational settings;16 and endorsing the university
experience as a means for students to stretch in being exposed to unfamiliar and even
seemingly hostile ideas. Indeed, on the last point, Palfrey argues that universities should
provide such “brave spaces” to aid student learning and growth.17
However, when confronted with the potential costs of hateful and intolerant speech,
he arrives at a somewhat different set of conclusions than Chemerinsky and Gillman.
Contrary to the latter two authors, Palfrey would endorse restrictions on hateful speech
and other forms of expression that would fundamentally undermine the role of the
university in aiding student learning and growth. 18 In addition, Palfrey emphasizes that
problematic, hateful speech is not equally problematic for everyone in a campus
community. Hateful speech tends to be targeted at certain well-defined constituencies—
racial minorities, women, LGBTQ students, etc.—so to not restrict such hateful speech
would be, in effect, to ask members of these more vulnerable constituencies to pay the
costs of a wide-open terrain of free speech that everyone else would be free to enjoy. 19
Palfrey is forthright—and correct, in my view—that his proposal does not align with
current legal doctrine, as it relates to public universities. Still his argument is one grounded
in the fundamental mission of the university to educate students. So long as students
admitted to a public or private university are given advance notice of its views on hate
speech or intolerant speech, he would support that university choosing to prohibit such
speech within its campus community. 20
Finally, though firmly rooted in current events, Keith Whittington provides the most
extensive and wide-ranging argument among these three books in a work that makes
extensive reference to history and philosophy. If Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Palfrey carry
some notes of administrative practicality in their analysis, Whittington provides the most
scholarly treatment of these issues. His starting point is an emphatic, and reasonable,
assumption that the core goal of a university is the production and dissemination of
knowledge.21 Free speech and academic freedom are absolutely necessary to this goal.22
Following up on this, Whittington echoes Chemerinsky and Gillman in expressing great
worry that university administrators charged with enforcing speech codes might easily
cross the line into illegitimate censorship, drawing on some historical discussion in support

13. PALFREY, supra note 1, at 3.
14. Id. at 8–13.
15. Id. at 90–91.
16. Id. at 93.
17. Id. at 28, 30–32.
18. PALFREY, supra note 1, at 17–19, 91–92, 96–106.
19. Id. at 16–17, 89. This is a point that has been strongly emphasized by others. See also Lawrence, supra
note 2, at 472–75; Matsuda, supra note 2, at 2376.
20. PALFREY, supra note 1, 96–106.
21. WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 13–18.
22. Id. at 19, 21–22, 29–30.
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of this point.23
Befitting its intellectual orientation, Whittington’s argument is clearly very
concerned with the processes of ideological exchange and development. As a result, he—
like Chemerinsky and Gillman, at least implicitly—offers an endorsement of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor in his defense of free speech. That is, referencing Justice
Holmes’s famous comments in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,24 Whittington
subscribes to the notion that the best means of discovering truth or achieving progress is
uninhibited debate, where the best ideas will rise to the top. As Holmes’s opinion also
emphasized, at the heart of this defense of free speech is a reminder for all to maintain
some degree of humility in their beliefs. A vigorous marketplace of ideas would remind
us all that even when we are certain of the rightness of a view, we could yet be proven
wrong.25
Still, like Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Palfrey, Whittington is sensitive to the
problems of an absolutist take on free speech. He agrees that harassing and threatening
speech should not be protected.26 He is sensitive to and conscientious about the many
critiques that have been made about the marketplace of ideas metaphor. 27 He would concur
with the idea of limiting free speech when it might conflict with academic expertise—the
latter itself being a crucial ingredient to a university’s ability to produce and disseminate
knowledge.28 Finally, Whittington is sensitive to the pull of equality and inclusion values
on university campuses.29 He is upfront in conceding the potential harms / limited value
of hateful speech, while also recognizing the need for civility in campus communities—
even if he would not endorse universities prohibiting the former or requiring the latter. 30
However, in the prioritization of these various values at play, Whittington is clear that the
production and dissemination of knowledge—with its intimate dependence upon vigorous
free speech guarantees—is paramount for the university. 31
II. HATE SPEECH, STUDENT LEARNING, AND THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY
Taken on their own terms, each book presents a plausible and well-thought-out
approach for dealing with the challenges of controversial campus speech. My critiques or
concerns stem less from any glaring deficiencies, and more from the inclination to
reprioritize some of the considerations insightfully identified in these books.
One could make the case for regulating hateful and intolerant speech by simply
refusing to concede the prioritization of free speech values over equality values in certain
situations when the two conflict.32 Indeed, as I will discuss later on, I think there are some
lines of argument in this vein that are well worth considering. But at least initially, let us
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 30, 35–36, 52, 87–89, 92, 129–30.
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 44–46.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 73.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 83, 86–92, 97–98.
Id. at 178–79.
See OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 12 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 802, 843.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol54/iss2/4

6

Chinn: Free Speech Controversies and Consequences on Campus
CHINN, S-FINAL COPY (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

FREE SPEECH CONTROVERSIES

2/15/2019 3:13 PM

231

begin from a less controversial starting point—that the production and dissemination of
knowledge is core to the mission of the university. Worth focusing on for the moment is
the dissemination of knowledge-component of this assertion. Undoubtedly disseminating
knowledge encompasses the typical scholarly activities we are familiar with, like
publications, conferences, op-eds, and other forms of engagement with both academic and
public audiences. But central within this task of disseminating knowledge is the
conveyance of knowledge in the classroom and elsewhere on campus. 33 If this is our
starting point, Palfrey’s argument actually points towards an interesting defense of hate
speech restrictions that would align with this core goal of the university, which would be
supportive of the intellectual exchange and growth that is core to the free speech defenses
we hear from Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Whittington.
In line with a point that Palfrey raises, perhaps greater consideration is warranted for
thinking through what elements are entailed in the task of disseminating knowledge and
educating. To his point, even if one were to concede that students’ intellectual
development was aided in some small (or large) degree by exposure to hateful, demeaning
speech, it is also not hard to imagine that the ability of certain students to learn—
particularly the targets of such speech—might be significantly impaired as a result. Again,
if the goal in question is the dissemination of knowledge within an intellectual community,
is it so obvious that this trade-off in likely consequences—minimal value of hate speech
versus potentially significant costs to student learning—clearly presses in favor of
allowing hateful speech? It is interesting that while Whittington’s focus on the distinctive
mission of the university leads him to a very strong defense of free speech rights, Palfrey
begins from a similar premise that leads to a somewhat different conclusion. Namely, one
might argue instead that the distinctive mission of the university to educate predominately
young learners provides particular reasons for university administrators to be sensitive to
the detrimental effects of hateful and intolerant speech upon student learning that may be
less compelling outside the campus context.
To be sure, one might question if this trade-off between problematic speech and
student capacity to learn is so stark or inevitable. Hence one finds occasional comments
by free speech supporters—who are also supportive of inclusion and student welfare—
expressing a hope that with more exposure to hateful ideas (and possibly with enough
support from the university that stops short of speech regulation) students will eventually
toughen up and any cost to their learning will be minimized. Indeed, this is how I would
read Chemerinsky and Gillman’s assertion that while “all ideas and views should be able
to be expressed on college campuses, no matter how offensive or how uncomfortable they
make people,” they also believe there are other steps “campuses can and should take to
create inclusive communities where all students feel protected.” 34 Indeed, Chemerinsky
and Gillman’s recommendation for university leaders to speak up forcefully in such
controversies can be seen as a means of encouraging this type of student growth. This is
an understandable aspiration for vulnerable students, and if we were confident about this
aspiration being realized, this would provide a convenient means of essentially having it
all—no restrictions on speech short of true threats or harassment, while also enjoying the
33. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 15–16.
34. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 19.
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satisfaction of seeing the equal rights of students to learn and acquire knowledge kept
intact.
But what if such confidence were not so warranted? Professors and others may have
all kinds of aspirations for college students, but the task of instruction and facilitating
learning also requires that educators at least partly meet students where they are. With that
in mind, some humility may be warranted on the part of commentators or observers who
would make guesses as to where the lines may reside between responsibly asking students
to stretch and grapple with uncomfortable ideas versus asking vulnerable students to
shoulder too much.
After all, as central as intellectual discovery and exchange may be for a university,
neither the ideas themselves nor the intellectual exchange are taking place in a vacuum.
Ideas are being offered, contested, and challenged in a social context where the processes
of learning and engagement are shaped by individuals. It is individuals who make specific
arguments, who receive those arguments, who give life to all manner of these debates, and
who then have to go on to live together in dorms, classes, and other venues for student life
in ways that may be more or less significantly affected by these debates. Thus, it may be
one thing to appreciate the broader contributions of intolerant speech for larger systemwide goals and purposes, and quite another to contemplate the effect of that speech on
specific individuals and constituencies. As Jeremy Waldron puts it, though with respect to
the topic of hate speech more generally:
Maybe we should admire some lawyer who says he hates what the racist says but defends to
the death his right to say it, yet this sort of intellectual resilience is not what’s at issue. The
question is about the direct targets of the abuse. Can their lives be led, can their children be
brought up, can their hopes be maintained and their worst fears dispelled, in a social
environment polluted by these materials?35

With this in mind, consider the argument put forth by Owen Fiss that perhaps the
larger goals of free speech—aiding democratic self-government, most prominently—
might be better served with a role for decision-makers to help curate exchanges of ideas.
The aspiration here would be to use the power of curation to ensure that as broad a range
of serious arguments are heard; to restrain those speakers who suck up too much time or
resources with their speech; or to restrain speakers who offer only speech of lesser value
that might also silence or exclude other potential voices in the discussion. 36 For a model
of what this might look like, one need only think of a typical college class that is small
enough to allow for significant student dialogue with the instructor or other students. In
this context, we all know that a professor’s syllabus and moderation of class discussion
serves precisely these goals.
To be sure, none of the books reviewed here disagree with the above points in
situations where professors regulate student comments in the classroom, or even when the
speech of professors is regulated when it conflicts with professional norms. The more
difficult question is whether such moderating norms have a place in the speech of the
broader campus—in the speech of students or faculty or other speakers—if such

35. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 33 (2012).
36. FISS, supra note 32, at 15–23.
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moderation is crucial to ensuring the educational function of the university. Here, Palfrey
and I part ways with Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Whittington. Even if our focus were
limited to just the core goal of a university to produce and disseminate knowledge, it is not
obvious that this goal—and the larger goals of free speech with which it is intimately
related—would not be enhanced with some careful and targeted regulation of the most
intolerant forms of speech.
III. SLIPPERY SLOPE CONCERNS
At this point, Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Whittington have a powerful counterargument: the specter of the slippery slope. Can members of the campus community trust
the censors? Both books urge proponents of hate speech regulations to approach the issue
with humility in at least two respects. First, one should maintain some humility in the face
of felt certainty that certain types of speech are of so little value that they can be confidently
excluded from the university campus. Second, one should also proceed cautiously if one
would pin their hopes for workable speech regulations upon university administrators, who
could end up making decisions based upon illegitimate considerations such as angering
potential donors, certain star faculty, potential applicants, or federal or state legislators
who may affect a university’s financial health through appropriations or grants. Indeed, as
noted before, the very ideal of the marketplace of ideas is premised upon a call for
individuals to exercise humility in their judgments of right and wrong.
This is a powerful argument, and Chemerinsky, Gillman, and Whittington helpfully
draw from some recent experiences of college campuses enforcing hate speech codes in
the 1990s to buttress their skepticism of more extensive speech regulations on campus. 37
Still, it is worth emphasizing some considerations that might give us a little more
confidence that a slightly more expansive set of speech acts beyond harassment could
plausibly be regulated. First, while any hate speech code would be dependent upon
decision-makers making context-sensitive judgments, the fact that racially and sexually
harassing speech is regulated both on campus and beyond, suggests that workable
standards are far from impossible to imagine. After all, there are legal rules and university
policies that draw lines between prohibited harassment and permissible offensive
speech—as Chemerinsky and Gillman helpfully clarify38—and this line is defined by
context-sensitive considerations. Again, at first glance, it is not clear why developing
workable lines to additionally regulate a subset of the most intolerant forms of expression
seems impossible.
Even closer to the campus context, however, the very business of academia entails
a host of judgment calls about which ideas and speech are worthy of being recognized,
whether it be on a class syllabus, in a class discussion, in invited faculty presentations, in
invited public speakers, in faculty promotion decisions, and in faculty hiring decisions. 39
37. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 97–107; WHITTINGTON, supra note 1, at 88–89.
38. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 118–23.
39. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE xii, 67 (2012); Robert C. Post, There is No 1st Amendment Right to
Speak on a College Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16526442/fir
st-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencer-protests. For Chemerinsky’s reply to this comment by Post,
which includes many of the arguments in the book reviewed here, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Hate Speech is
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Given that academic expertise is premised upon discriminating between ideas—and
deeming some ideas to be of marginal to low value—the insistent references to the
marketplace of ideas metaphor and the refrain for humility in the context of university
campuses strikes this reviewer at least as a little far-fetched. There are all sorts of ways in
which the academic enterprise is premised upon a rejection of humility in the face of
expertise. Also, there seems to be a fairly strong near-consensus among academics that
there is very little of value for the exchange of ideas, or for the growth in collective
knowledge, or for student growth, in subjecting a campus community to hanging nooses,
individuals dressing in blackface, and the use of epithets deployed as a means of
denigrating or insulting (rather than in a research or instructional context). 40 Given this,
the emphatic anxiety over potentially regulating a narrow subset of intolerant speech may
seem a little out of proportion.
Again, as noted above, both Chemerinsky and Gillman, and Whittington
acknowledge the role of academic expertise in the life of the university. However, both
would seemingly cabin this restraining influence to discrete functions of the university
such as research and teaching. But one might wonder at the attractiveness of cabining
academic expertise in this manner. As Robert Post notes:
The entire purpose of a university is to educate and to expand knowledge, and so everything
a university does must be justified by reference to these twin purposes. These objectives
govern all university action, inside and outside the classroom; they are as applicable to
nonprofessional speech as they are to student and faculty work.41

More generally, my main observation here is that some core elements of the
academic enterprise—deference to expertise and idea discrimination—sit in tension with
Chemerinsky, Gillman’s, and Whittington’s appeal to humility and uncertainty in
opposing potential speech regulations. Especially if content and idea evaluation is so
central to the academic mission, the prospect of cabining certain forms of denigrating and
low-value expression seems hardly alien or misaligned with the usual functions of higher
educational institutions.
IV. EQUALITY
Finally, we might also interrogate these questions from a somewhat more
controversial starting point: by giving greater weight to equality values. Free speech
defenders rightly ground their arguments in the First Amendment, but a constitutional
commitment to anti-caste or equal citizenship is equally and firmly grounded in the 13 th,
14th, and 15th Amendments.42 With this in mind, the case for some targeted campus hate
speech codes may rest not just in aiding student learning; or in administrative workability;
Protected Free Speech, Even on College Campuses, VOX (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speech-first-amendment-protest.
40. To quote Waldron again, “racist or religious defamation is not just an idea contributed to a debate. In its
published, posted, or pasted-up form, hate speech can become a world-defining activity, and those who
promulgate it know very well—this is part of their intention—that the visible world they create is a much harder
world for the targets of their hatred to live in.” WALDRON, supra note 35, at 74.
41. See POST, supra note 39.
42. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 795–96, 798–801; Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments:
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 125–26, 151–60 (1992).
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or in aligning with other facets of the academic mission, including academic expertise.
The case for regulating campus hate speech may also rest on giving appropriate
recognition to the constitutional principle of equal citizenship. I offer no strong opinions
here about how such a rationale may fare with respect to regulating hate speech beyond
the university context, though clearly an equal citizenship rationale would, by its very
terms, reach more broadly. For now, I would suggest that an equal citizenship rationale
might have particular force in the educational context, given commonly articulated links
by judicial actors and others between education, individual growth, and democratic
citizenship.43
In saying this, I am not suggesting that the Reconstruction Amendments should be
categorically prioritized over the First Amendment; I am merely suggesting that when the
two are in conflict, we should give the former greater weight than staunch defenders of the
First Amendment may be inclined to do. Notwithstanding the wise counsel from First
Amendment defenders about the value of humility, the Reconstruction Amendments do
stand out, of course, as fundamental components of our legal structure. I would hesitate to
claim that these Amendments can or should be used to justify the banishment of all
inegalitarian thoughts and actions from the polity. But I do think these Amendments
plausibly support the regulation of expression that invokes “badges of servitude” and
second-class citizenship status that undermine the foundations of equal citizenship. 44
Conceptualized in this way, the problem of hateful or intolerant speech on campus
might begin to take on a slightly different cast, where the potential harms at stake are not
just those perpetrated by the state against an individual’s free speech (which is the scenario
usually contemplated with the worry about slippery-slope censorship). While state
censorship should rightfully be a worry, a focus on equal citizenship alerts us to how the
rights at stake with hate speech encompass both rights enjoyed by the individual against
violations by the state, and rights enjoyed by the individual against violations by other
individuals.
This leads to my final point: all three books rightfully note some generational
dynamics at play in the current controversies over campus speech. Chemerinsky and
Gillman, in particular, discuss at one point their concern that students today may not fully
appreciate all components of our free speech tradition, among them the anti-Vietnam War
student protests, which were formative events in the lives of the two authors. 45 They also
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education.”).
44. As Fiss states:
Those favoring liberty often refer to the role that free speech played in securing equality during the
1960s, suggesting that free and open debate is a precondition for achieving a true and substantive
equality. But certainly the converse may also be true: that a truly democratic politics will not be
achieved until conditions of equality have been fully satisfied.
FISS, supra note 32, at 12.
45. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 1, at 10–11.
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express their admiration for current students too—particularly their sense of empathy for
their more vulnerable classmates.46 Without a doubt, each generation takes different
events as their signposts for key political and moral questions, and those generations who
did not live through the anti-Vietnam War protests may indeed be missing an intuitive
grasp of certain elements of free speech that an earlier generation may generally find easier
to access.
That said, if these protests can be informative for present-day speech debates, there
is a sense in which this touchstone for an earlier generation is also limiting as a reference
point for present controversies: the exercise of free speech rights by private individuals in
the service of protesting governmental actions are, to my mind, quite different than the
exercise of free speech rights by private individuals in the service of degrading or
dehumanizing other private individuals.47 Our approach to free speech rights must also be
informed by the context of the present too, and there is little doubt that college students
today are living through highly unusual times that really have no ready analogue in at least
the past several decades of American history. Our assessment of these issues should take
that into account as well. Before too long, this generation will mature into the next class
of lawyers and judges, and their perceptions of social harm, social stigma, and the role of
the state will be the ones that will nudge our constitutional law toward yet another stage in
development—and perhaps a less libertarian-oriented view of free speech.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, these three books are welcome interventions on a question that will
no doubt live on to trouble future generations. In agreement with all three books, I do think
the key question in campus speech controversies boils down to how best to balance
important and sometimes competing values. As I have suggested above, there is something
compelling to me about regulating a certain class of deeply intolerant speech, due to both
its disproportionate harms upon vulnerable constituencies on college campuses, and its
minimal value for the production of knowledge, or the search for the truth, or aiding
democratic self-government. The most compelling concern about considering such
regulations is the fear that a campus community, and its administrators, are incapable of
doing a defensible job in drawing lines of permissibility and impermissibility. However, I
would nevertheless prefer that public and private universities grapple with that challenge
rather than concede its impossibility, and I would favor seeing constitutional doctrine that
provided, rather than denied, public university authorities this latitude.

46. Id. at 10.
47. FISS, supra note 32, at 21.
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